Macalester College

DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Sociology Honors Projects

Sociology Department

4-26-2016

Battle for the Soul of the Working Class:
Trajectories and Dynamics of Class Politics in the
United States and France
Junius Brown
Macalester College

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/soci_honors
Part of the Sociology Commons
Recommended Citation
Brown, Junius, "Battle for the Soul of the Working Class: Trajectories and Dynamics of Class Politics in the United States and France"
(2016). Sociology Honors Projects. 55.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/soci_honors/55

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sociology Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Battle for the Soul of the Working Class:
Trajectories and Dynamics of Class Politics in the United States and France

By:
Junius Brown

Advisor:
Chaitanya Mishra, Sociology Dept.

Submitted 26 April 2016
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Trajectories and Dynamics of Class Politics in the United States and France

Abstract
Donald Trump’s unexpected lead in the ongoing US presidential primaries has
come as a shock to observers on the Right and Left alike. Bernie Sanders has also done
unexpectedly well, casting doubt on the long-held assumption that a self-styled Socialist
campaign is impossible in the United States. In this paper, I will attempt to gain a better
understanding of these trends through a comparative-historical study of the United States
and France; the latter recently elected François Hollande of the Parti Socialiste, but has
also seen the steady rise of the far-right Front National now led by Marine Le Pen. Based
on this comparison, I will argue that even though France has a stronger history of
organizing politics along class lines, in both countries the left-wing candidate has struggled
to balance radical rhetoric with the interests of upper-class liberals. This, in turn, has
allowed right-wing populists to appeal more directly to the anger of working-class whites
marginalized by long-term structural changes in the labor market.
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To many political observers, Bernie Sanders’s unexpected rise during the summer
of 2015 signals a sea change in American politics. By defining himself as a Socialist,
Sanders proudly labeled his campaign with a term which many on the Right regularly use
as a political insult. And in spite of initial predictions that running under that name would
be “quixotic at best” (Roberts 2015b), he has outdone all other Democratic competitors
save for Hillary Clinton. He has also challenged another key aphorism of American
political life: that class politics, the self-conscious organization of political parties and
movements around the interests of economic and social classes, is all but impossible in
the exceptional circumstances of the United States. Even though he has not called for the
sweeping nationalization of private industry, he has made an ambitious step in the
direction of social democracy, and many of his policies would not look terribly out of
place in the platform of a European middle-left party (Roberts 2015a). Indeed, even
though Sanders is better described as a Social Democrat than a hardline Socialist, this is
still a major step to the left for the US.
Donald Trump, on the other hand, has been branded by opponents as the
quintessential voice of American Capitalism. An ostentatious multi-billionaire with no
qualms about discussing his net worth, he has never held office but claimed from day one
that his business experience will allow him to run the country efficiently (Ronayne 2015).
This claim is not without its supporters in a country where faith in established politicians
and bureaucrats has fallen so low. His speeches, however, do not suggest any kind of
detached elitism, at least not the kind that plagued Romney in 2012. Trump has earned a
solid reputation for disregarding the norms of political correctness, asserting in one
notorious case that undocumented immigrants are “rapists” and “killers” (Scott 2015) and
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proposing that Muslims be temporarily barred from entering the United States (McCarthy
et al. 2015). In spite of controversial remarks like these, he nevertheless shot to the top of
the polls over the summer, and as of this writing holds a firm lead in the Republican
presidential primaries. While clearer perhaps in retrospect, this should not be taken for
granted. Trump’s sudden and spectacular rise was not merely an upset against established
conservative elites like Jeb Bush, who did well in the pre-caucus “money primary” but
quickly lost ground in the polls. It also represents a break with the emerging Republican
“far right” composed of Tea Partyers and evangelical Christians, who mix a firm belief in
small government with traditional religious social-conservatism. A candidate who says
what he thinks and believes what he says, Trump has capitalized not only on his status as
a Washington outsider but also on his straightforward and politically incorrect tone.
What’s more, his anger seems to resonate with working-class white conservatives
suspicious that their American Dream is being stolen. But how does Bernie Sanders’s
“Socialist” (read: Social Democratic) campaign, or Donald Trump’s brand of allAmerican populism, actually compare to the right and left of European politics?
For a clearer perspective on this issue, I look across the Atlantic to France.
Needless to say, the two countries have very deep differences. While the United States
was born of immigration and has long struggled with issues of race, France as a nation
was shaped by the imposition of metropolitan and republican values. And while
Socialism has long been considered a fringe idea in the US, in France the Parti Socialiste
has been the main Left party for the better part of a century. The two countries’ political
institutions, including their procedures for electing a president, also differ considerably.
Yet a broader look at the last few decades of French presidential politics suggests that the
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relatively sudden emergence of Trump and Sanders in the United States resembles a
longer-term electoral trend in France. On the Left, François Hollande of the Parti
Socialiste managed to win the 2012 election on a platform which, though moderate, still
made class appeals along Social Democratic lines (Hewlett 2012). This was by no means
an easy feat, as since the 1980s (in many ways, since it came into existence) the Parti
Socialiste has been divided by internal fractures over cultural issues and the balance
between radicalism and reform. These fractures have opened the way for Jean-Marie Le
Pen of the Front National, and later his daughter Marine, to stir up working-class anger
and discontent by blaming immigrants for stealing jobs, spreading crime, and threatening
French culture (Hewlett 2012). These similarities, when considered alongside the deeper
structural differences between France and the United States, offer a promising
opportunity for comparison.
In this paper, I will examine the current dynamics and historical trajectories of
class politics in these two countries. I will begin by laying out a theoretical framework for
defining and understanding class politics, followed by an overview of my methods. From
there, I will move into a comparative-historical analysis of France and the United States,
tracing the development of class politics in both countries, the ways in which recent
presidential candidates have appealed to class, and the extent to which they have gained
lower-class support. Based on this comparison, I will argue that although France has a
much richer history of explicitly class-based politics than the United States, in both
contexts Socialist parties are constrained by the conflicting demands of their workingclass and reformist-liberal constituencies, allowing right-wing populists to capture the
support of white working-class conservatives with rhetoric based on anti-immigrant
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anger. In my conclusion, I will assess the implications which these findings present for
the study of class politics in western democracies.
Theoretical Framework
Social class, let alone class politics, is something of a nebulous concept.
Weakliem and Adams (2011) offer a useful framework for navigating it by dividing
accounts of class politics along two dimensions. The first concerns whether workingclass identity is a spontaneous product of economic conditions, or a constructed product
of mobilization by parties and other political actors. The second concerns whether
Socialism is (or should be) directed primarily by the laborers themselves, or with the aid
of all classes, including elites. By measuring along these two axes, one can divide class
accounts into broad categories which emphasize Differences, Consciousness, Coalitions,
and Hegemony (see Figure 1). For greater clarity, in this paper I will associate these
perspectives with Alford, Marx, Weber, and Gramsci, respectively.

Figure 1: Four perspectives of class-politics analysis (Weakliem and Adams 2011)
Removed for copyright reasons.

The “Consciousness” perspective forms the background for “classical” class
theory, and includes (but is not limited to) the Marxist and Leninist approaches. In the

Robert Alford theorized that one can one can determine the “class” nature of a movement by measuring
the “difference” between its working-class and other-class support; e.g. if 50% of workers and 20% of
managers support a Left movement, its class nature can be determined by the (50-20=) 30% difference
(Weakliem and Adams 2011)
1
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narrowest but most illustrative version of this perspective, class interests exist primarily
in terms of one’s relationship to the System of Production, and as Capitalist society
develops it will steadily converge toward a full dichotomy in which virtually all
individuals are either wage laborers or owners of capital. Marx ([1847] 1978) predicts
that as this two-dimensional division progresses, wage laborers will eventually unite to
form a unified “class for itself” which is conscious of its own interests not only as they
relate to individual workers, but also as they relate to the working class as a whole. Many
Marxist scholars derive from this passage the concept of a “class in itself,” which has
objective interests but lacks subjective self-awareness, though Edward Andrew (1983)
points out that the term “class in itself” and the usual meaning given to it do not actually
appear in Marx’s work. Whatever its origins, however, the debate over the subjective and
objective interests of the working class, and with it the notion of an obstructive “false
consciousness,” still lurks behind the scenes in both Marxist and non-Marxist literature.
More recent scholars have tended to lean further toward the perspective which
Weakliem and Adams identify as Hegemony. In contrast to Marx’s theory, this approach
treats the fragmented, shifting, and intersecting subjectivity of the working class not as a
“false consciousness,” but as the actual set of diverse identities which form in a modern
society. In this sense it echoes Weber ([1921] 2010), who conceives of class not as
Proletariat and Bourgeoisie, or even as upper, middle, and lower, but as a wide range of
loyalties and identities which are more likely to cluster around a single profession or
factory. To this, the Hegemony perspective also adds the Gramscian notion that class is
as much a social-cultural concept as an economic one, meaning that class movements (or,
more accurately, populist movements) may be organized around forms of identity which
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extend beyond income and employment (Weakliem and Adams 2011). This holds true for
whites as well as minorities. Evans (1993) finds that that while British lower-class voters
tend to react to feelings of powerlessness with increased support for redistribution, and
middle class voters react with a desire to roll back the welfare state, in both groups
powerlessness is associated with socially conservative and socially authoritarian views.
This is one of the strong points of the Gramscian (or Hegemony) perspective. Rather than
treating the flow of low-income voters to right-wing extremism as a result of preferences
and worldviews that are confused, ill-informed, or outright false, it recognizes that there
are other cultural fault lines and markers of identity which can guide individuals more
strongly than unified proletarian abstractions, especially in the presence of active rightwing political parties. For this reason, I believe it is better-suited than the Marxian notion
of “class consciousness” for examining class and populist movements in today’s western
democracies.
The Gramscian perspective is also useful because individuals’ actual income,
profession, and relationship to the means of production do not always predict where they
will place themselves on the social pyramid. Although he admits that people’s selfevaluations of class are a notoriously poor indicator of their actual class position, Josh
Curtis (2013) nevertheless argues that such self-assessed measures are valuable precisely
because of what they tell us about subjective identity. It has long been theorized, for
example, that in developed economies people of all backgrounds are more likely to
identify as “middle-class.” Curtis finds that as per-capita GDP increases people are also
more likely to identify with the lower class, and that as inequality increases people are
more likely to identify with either the upper class or the lower class (Curtis 2013).
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According to his dataset of developed countries, only about a third of Americans identify
with the middle class, less than his model predicts based on per-capita GDP but more
than it predicts based on income inequality. In any case, this figure contradicts the wider
assumption that middle-class identity is exceptionally prevalent in the US.
In this paper, I examine class politics primarily as it relates to the appeals made by
political parties and presidential candidates. The Marxian and Gramscian models of class
politics both assume that political parties play a role in creating class identities, reaching
out to many different groups with appeals to shared benefits and interests (Weakliem and
Adams 2011). Within the United States, Hill and Leighley (1996) find that the strength
and liberalism of the local Democratic Party correlates with poor and working-class voter
turnout during presidential election years, suggesting that the party mobilizes these voters
for support. In countries with multiple major parties the situation is more complex.
Predictably, Hicks and Swank (1992) find that Left-party governments, as well as Right
and Center governments facing pressure from major Left opposition parties, are more
likely to implement progressive welfare systems. But Left governments facing strong
opposition are easily reined in, and when all else is held equal, Center parties are more
active implementers of welfare than Left parties. Hicks and Swank (1992) attribute this
outcome to Center parties’ need to placate Left-wing movements or win over their voters,
itself a sign of party mobilization around class, but also note that in many European
countries the centrist party implementing welfare was guided by Christian-democratic
and liberal-democratic values. This marks the distinguishing feature between the Marxian
and Gramscian models; while both anticipate that parties will appeal to fragmented
economic interests, the latter also pays attention to the mobilization of “classes” along

Brown 8
other lines of identity (Weakliem and Adams 2011). This feature makes it particularly
appropriate for studying class politics in western democracies, especially France and the
United States.
Methods
In order to understand the dynamics of class politics in greater detail, I decided to
analyze the United States and France in a comparative-historical study. More specifically,
I employ what Goldstone (2003) categorizes as Congruence Testing: I investigate two
cases of interest which should in theory yield different results, and search for unexpected
similarities. I selected France and the United States because they offer enough common
ground to form a basis for comparison, but are also different enough that one might
expect different class outcomes. Both are western industrial democracies, highly
developed but transitioning from a factory economy to a knowledge economy, and both
are destinations for immigrants from the Global South. Their histories of class politics, on
the other hand, are very different; the Parti Socialiste has been the leading party on the
French Left for the better part of a century, while the various American Socialist parties
rarely captured more than a small fringe of the vote even during their peak. Yet in spite of
this, the French presidential election of 2012 saw a Social-Democrat running against a
far-right populist, offering an intriguing parallel with Sanders and Trump in the United
States. Presidential politics also offers a promising level of comparison, as both France
and the United States have a fairly strong popularly elected executive, though the details
of electoral law have produced different party systems in both countries. Hill and
Leighley (1996) also find that at least in the US, the Democratic Party mobilizes lowerclass voters more actively during presidential election years. For this reason, I focus on
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selected presidential candidates rather than looking at party appeals in state and local
elections.
While in a large-N statistical study it might be questionable to select limited
aspects of only two cases, this is appropriate for the approach that I am using. As Skocpol
(1978) points out, “…comparative-historical analysis works best when applied to a set of
a few cases that share certain basic features. Cases need to be carefully selected and the
criteria for grouping them together made explicit.” As my goal is not to develop a new
and universally generalizable model of class politics, but to see how well existing models
apply in practice, sacrificing the breadth of the study in exchange for greater depth is a
necessary and acceptable trade-off.
Due to the practical difficulties in amassing nationally representative surveys on
the United States and France or obtaining interviews with national politicians in each, I
rely primarily on existing literature. There is already an abundance of scholarly work on
long-term political trends in the United States and France, which will allow me to gain a
deeper understanding about political trends in both countries, though as far as I am aware
this is the first paper to examine the two countries’ class politics in a comparative light. I
plan to supplement scholarly literature with information from news articles, as some of
the events I cover are sufficiently recent that as of this writing no other academic studies
have mentioned them. Although the use of non-scholarly news articles may suggest some
loss in the credibility of information, Helbling (2014) and other authors in the social
movement field have found that press reports of political candidates’ stances on major
issues are generally accurate. Nevertheless, I made an effort to screen news publishers for
credibility, and did not reference articles with obvious bias on the part of the author.
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Throughout the paper, and especially in my section on ongoing trends in the
United States, I supplement these academic and journalistic sources with tables of polling
data. With a few exceptions, most of these data come from polls conducted by Quinnipiac
University (Malloy 2015, Mallopy 2016a, Malloy 2016b, Schwarz 2016). Quinnipiac
University’s polling center is widely cited by major journalistic sources as a reliable and
unbiased source of information; in the 2010 midterm Senate elections it was the most
accurate of the major polling organizations in operation (Tanenbaum 2010). I also chose
this source because it published detailed polls which analyzed candidates’ support and
favorability in light of ideology, race, gender, and several other variables, and because it
released updated results for its national poll on a monthly basis, allowing me to keep up
with electoral trends as the long 2016 presidential campaign unfolded.
France
Even by West European standards, France is distinguished by a rich and turbulent
history of class politics. The French Revolution was first and foremost a class event,
carried out in a reaction against the wealth and privilege of the aristocracy and promising
equality and brotherhood for all. Upon closer examination, however, the history of class
politics in France is more complicated than it first appears. While France has an active
far-left movement, including not only the Parti Socialiste but also the Parti Communiste
Francais and an assortment of other radical movements, the history of these groups is
often characterized by division rather than unity. Shaken by these divisions, the PS has
steadily transitioned from a far-left party to a center-left one, periodically making appeals
to class struggle and radical reform but pursuing more moderate policies in practice. On
the Right, meanwhile, two generations of Le Pens have steadily transformed the Front
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National from a fringe group into a major political force–and have, in the process,
captured a sizeable number of white working-class voters from the PCF. At the same
time, rising popular unrest over immigration has lent strength to the nationalist appeals of
the French Right, leaving the Left caught between its liberal and working-class
constituencies.
Like many West European countries, France has a more pluralistic assortment of
parties than the United States, with minor parties on the far left, far right, and center
holding seats in parliament and consistently securing over 5% of the vote in presidential
elections. France’s unique two-tier presidential election system, however, limits the
ability of minor parties to secure the executive branch. The first round of voting is
pluralistic, with all parties large and small running their candidates simultaneously, but
the two candidates with the highest vote totals then move on to a second round decided
by an absolute majority (Cole 2011). In theory, the first round allows any party to reach
the national runoff, provided it can gather enough votes. But because only the top two
finishers reach the second stage, both the Left and the Right have an incentive to form
voting coalitions around the most viable candidates. The consequences of failing to do so
were aptly demonstrated in 2002, when the Left vote was split so heavily that the final
round resulted in a runoff between the center-right Jacques Chriac and the far-right JeanMarie Le Pen.2 Since 1978, the final round has usually been divided between the Parti
Socialiste (PS) and the dominant center-right party of the time.3 Both of these parties

2

Not to be confused with the current leader of the Front National, Marine Le Pen, who is Jean-Marie’s
daughter.
3
From 1981 to 2002, the French center-right was divided between several minor parties, but Jacques
Chirac’s RPR (Rassemblement pour la République, Rally for the Republic) consistently gained the most
votes. In 2002 these parties merged into the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), the party of
president Chirac and later president Sarkozy. In May 2015, the UMP was renamed Les Républicains (LR).
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have experienced fractures, mergers, and in the latter case name changes, but their
relative ideological positions have remained fairly steady since the 1970s (Williams
2011). And both remain particularly attentive to the interests of minor parties, seeking to
either gain their endorsement in coalitions or to pull away their voters by echoing their
rhetoric.
Historical Trajectory
Since the 19th century, ideology and culture have driven and divided class
movements in France. The French Revolution, long considered a watershed for lowerclass organization against the aristocracy, was also a reaction against the Church–a
reaction which forged a sense of citizenship rooted in individualism, secularism, and the
virtues of republican government (Raymond 2009). Over the century that followed,
French secularism developed into a sort of national religion, drilled into students’ minds
as the characteristic that distinguished France from its new rival Germany. Hard
Secularism did not mean tolerance of all faiths, as the Dreyfus Affair and the shock
waves of anti-Semitism that followed it amply demonstrate (Pike 2014). Nor was it
welcomed by a ready-made national polity; successive regimes worked hard to
homogenize France in a process that can only be called “self-colonization” (Kenan 2015).
The latter term is no exaggeration; by the late 19th century, Parisian elites and French
scholars alike considered French rural peasants not only a poorer class, but also a
culturally inferior race.
By the close of the 19th century, with the homogenization of the working class
well underway, class-based politics grew nearer to the Marxist ideal of working-class
consciousness. Today’s Parti Socialiste traces its roots back to the “French Section of the
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Workers’ International” or SFIO, established in 1905 at the orders of the Second
International itself (Cole 2011). Even in this period, however, Proletarian slogans
concealed deep internal fractures. The six parties merged at the International’s orders had
until then followed diverse traditions ranging from radical anarchism to moderate
reformism, and in 1920 the more radical Parti Communiste Francaise (PCF) split away,
leaving both parties in a struggle to cast their own faction as the true voice of the working
class (Cole 2011). By the 1930s, both parties planned their respective May Day parades
on separate routes to prevent brawls from breaking out between their members (Pike
2014). In spite of its revolutionary slogans, the early Parti Socialiste was from the very
beginning a Gramscian coalition which brought together differing Leftist traditions and
shielded deep cultural fractures. Only in 1936, faced with rising pressure from the French
Right and the Spanish Civil War, would the two sides overcome their differences and
unite. The resulting Front Populaire managed to sweep the 1936 elections by 57 percent
to 43 (Pike 2014), but this victory was short-lived. The very next year, it fell apart.
Opposing the short-lived Front Populaire was the Front National, though this
union of parties shared little with today’s FN beyond its name. The French far-right
movements of the interwar years were deeply religious, calling for the restoration of the
monarchy and the creation of a state guided by principles of Catholicism and corporatism
(Pike 2014). They were viciously anti-Semitic, and showered Mussolini and Franco with
praise, but were distrustful of Hitler and Germany in general (Pike 2014). On
Nationalism, however, the interwar Right begins to resemble its descendant today. In an
interview with the Right-leaning Journal de Toulouse, Marshal Pétain, the celebrated
general of Verdun, bemoaned France’s fading national identity:
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The crisis here with us is not a material crisis. We have lost faith in our
destiny, that sums it up. We are like sailors without a pilot, without a rudder.
That is what we need to struggle against. That is where we need to find a
mystique. Call it what you want: a national mystique, or more simply a
mystique of memory. Without that, there is no solution. Here we are, only
after millions of others before us have worked and suffered for us to be what
we are. They have the right to demand of us that we at least persevere in
their struggle (Le Journal de Toulouse 1936).
Taken out of context, Pétain’s remarks would not look out of place in a Front National
rally or publication today. Even though the specific enemies have changed, this core
complaint remains the same: that by embracing liberal values, be they secularism or
multiculturalism, France has lost sight of its national identity. Returning to the Gramscian
perspective, it is a complaint that extends beyond material interest to unite a persistent
cross-class movement on the basis of deeper cultural and national sentiment.
World War Two, and the German occupation that followed, exiled ethnocentrism,
nationalism, and anti-Semitism to the distant margins of political life (Williams 2011).
General de Gaulle, who was appointed President 1958 and held power for ten years,
provided a further interruption. Though de Gaulle was solidly aligned with the CenterRight, to the point that Gaullist became a synonym for conservative, his core policy of
dirigisme was based on exceptionally active state participation in the economy (Prasad
2005). Unlike traditional egalitarian Socialism, however, dirigisme was invoked not in
the name of improving equity but in the name of developing the national economy. De
Gaulle’s tax code was highly regressive, and his pension system was most beneficial to
the middle and upper-middle classes. But because most revenue came through an
invisible sales tax, while pension contributions were listed on paychecks, low-income
voters still expressed high support for De Gaulle’s economic policy (Prasad 2005). As a
result, the French welfare system largely survived the Neoliberal era.
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Cooperation and competition with other Leftist parties, meanwhile, placed diverse
demands on the Parti Socialiste. On the one hand, the PS continued to highlight its radical
origins in pre-election rhetoric, striving to claim its credentials as an outsider movement
rather than an established political group (Cole 2011). Yet in order to rule the country
pragmatically, and appeal to more moderate voters, it began leaning toward center-left
policies in practice. These tensions came to the forefront of French Left politics during
and after François Mitterrand’s election as President in 1981. In his effort to secure the
presidency, Mitterrand tried to frame his Parti Socialiste as a viable choice but still drew
on radical rhetoric to pull over PCF voters. Once elected, however, he shunned
revolutionary change in favor of gradual economic reforms, and abandoned even these in
1984 (Cole 2011). While Mitterrand remained in office until 1996, his about-face
alienated his party’s radical wing and caused the PCF to withdraw yet again from the Left
coalition.
As the French Left shook in the 1980s and 1990s, Jean-Marie Le Pen moved in to
take advantage of the instability (Cole 2003). Many of the early supporters who flocked
to his party were working-class members of the PS or PCF, who, frustrated with the Left,
had instead turned to voice their discontent on the Right. The flow of voters from one end
of the spectrum to another was also driven by the PCF’s own reversal from a radically
xenophobic party to a radically multicultural one. While in 1980 its local council in Vitry
hijacked a bulldozer and used it to level an immigrant hostel, by 1992 the PCF was
instead drawing criticism for its outspoken defense of the hijab (Raymond 2009). After
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, bringing with it the last shreds of legitimacy that
hardline Communism had enjoyed during the late Cold War, millions more disgruntled
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white workers turned to the far right in search of authoritarian answers (Williams 2011).
The new enemies were not Capitalists and bankers, but criminals, immigrants, and the
European Union, three threats the Front National promised to repel.
Of these three, immigration deserves special mention here. France has long been a
destination for immigrants from other parts of Europe; in the mid-20th century, these were
joined by a northward flow from France’s former colonies in North Africa. In spite of the
violent civil war in Algeria, these early immigrants were predominantly secular, and were
received at least passively by French politicians (Kenan 2015). But by the 1980s, many
French already treated immigrants as a scapegoat for France’s high unemployment and
other social ills. Until that time, immigration had never been a heavily politicized issue,
occasionally drawing moderate comments from major politicians but seldom emerging as
a major issue in elections (Williams 2011). But Jean-Marie Le Pen placed xenophobia at
the core of his party, tapping on a deep well of working-class unrest before any of the
other major parties could move to exploit it (Williams 2011). In doing so, he benefited
from France’s nationalist legacy, creating a movement that uses republican-nationalist
framing more than any other European far-right party (Helbling 2014). He also benefited
from a steady rise in Islamophobia, as the French population–and, indeed, much of
Western and Central Europe–grew increasingly suspicious of Middle Eastern
immigrants’ Muslim faith, associating it with a predilection for intolerance and terrorism.
By the time of the 2007 presidential election, immigration had clearly moved to the
center of the political debate, both as an economic issue and a cultural one.
Presented with this challenging new issue, and the prospect of competition with a
much stronger radical right, the French Left has struggled to reach a coherent position. In
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its rushed reforms of the early 1980s, the Mitterrand administration set out to mitigate the
previous government’s aggressive deportation policy, but by 1983 it had reversed course
on these commitments as well (Raymond 2009). The same drama played out in 1988, as
the Parti Socialiste returned to power in Parliament but renewed the expedited
deportation they had railed against in the previous term. Cultural issues proved even more
troubling. In early debates over whether girls should be permitted to wear the hijab in
school, the PS was split between those who saw the hijab as one’s freedom of expression
and those who saw it as a tool for oppressing women (Raymond 2009). Unlike Germany,
the Netherlands, and the UK, which at least in name experimented with multiculturalism,
in France the center-left remained committed to a hard-secular citizenship based on
adoption of a French national identity (Kenan 2015). For some time they even tried to
repeat Napoleon’s taming of the Catholic Church by creating an “Islam de France” based
on republican virtues of equality and commitment to the state (Raymond 2009). Yet the
2004 prohibition of religious symbols in schools, and the 2010 ban on wearing the burqa
in public, left individual PS officials divided and uncertain on the question of how to
balance republicanism with minority rights. This division and uncertainty highlights the
relevance of the Gramscian model of class politics: although they were united around a
Leftist cause, PS officials and voters were divided on how to respond when the French
population became increasingly polarized around a cultural issue.
In 2002, with the Left coalition divided, Jean-Marie Le Pen secured just enough
votes to narrowly bypass the PS candidate Lionel Jospin and reach second place in the
first round (Mondon 2013). A memorable electoral upset, this left voters presented with a
choice between a center-right candidate and a far-right one, and sparked outrage on the
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Left. In the end, voters reluctantly but overwhelmingly decided to side with the lesser of
two evils, and the UMP incumbent Chirac won by an 82% landslide. On the left, the
events of 2002 created new pressures to vote in coalitions around the Parti Socialiste
candidate in order to avoid another first-round debacle. Combined with the flight of FN
swing-voters who until then thought they were throwing away their ballots in harmless
protest, this left Jean-Marie Le Pen with poor results in 2007’s first round (Mondon
2013). Yet when Jean-Marie’s youngest daughter, Marine Le Pen, succeeded her father
for control of the party in 2011, she greeted these challenges with a newfound optimism.
In the 2012 presidential elections she won almost six and a half million votes for 17.9%
of the nationwide total, better in both absolute and proportional terms than her father had
done in 2002 (Mondon 2013). While this was not enough to reach the final runoffs, as PS
voters had yet again set aside their internal divisions to avoid a repeat of 2002, it was
enough to confirm that the poor showing in 2007 was not the end of the Front National.
Dynamics of the 2012 Election
François Hollande’s victory in the 2012 election must be understood in the
context of the global economic crisis, and in particular the European instability which
followed it. In Europe, financial instability surrounding the Euro created a series of
aftershocks well after 2008, and when voters went to the polls in April 2012 political and
economic pundits were already speculating that France could follow the same path as
Greece and Spain (Hewlett 2012). Hollande’s success in the final round of voting was
also aided by the plummeting popularity of the UMP incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose
extravagant lifestyle and cozy relationship with the upper class had made him deeply
unpopular among French of all backgrounds (Hewlett 2012). By contrast, Hollande was
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friendly, mild-mannered, and free from scandal, though his reputation on the latter point
has since been tarnished. All these factors helped him to secure victory in the election of
2012, the first time in almost twenty years that a Socialist had held the presidency.
Across much of the European Union, fears of financial instability were answered
by harsh and unpopular austerity measures, but Hollande’s 2012 campaign promised
Keynesian reforms and redistribution. Incomes over €1 million were to be taxed at 75%,
with a minimum 45% tax on incomes over €150,000, and similar increases in the taxes on
capital gains and corporations (Hewlett 2012). Although these promises were a far cry
from even Mitterrand’s modest reforms, he supported them with strong leftist rhetoric
which calls to mind the Parti Socialiste’s radical past and would not be entirely out of
place at a Sanders rally in the US:
But before talking about my plan, I’ll tell you one thing. In this battle in
which I am engaged, I will tell you who my opponent, my true opponent,
is. It has no name, no face, no party, it has never presented its candidacy, it
will never be elected, yet it governs. This opponent is the world of finance.
Before our eyes, in the last twenty years, finance has taken control of the
economy, the society, and even our lives (Hollande 2012).
Despite these strong words, Hollande was not such a strong enemy of finance in practice.
His sharp tax increases were accompanied by relatively little stimulus spending, and in
fact he used the revenue to reduce France’s deficit in compliance with EU regulations
(Hewlett 2012). For his truly large spending projects, which were mostly aimed at
replacing France’s nuclear plants with other sources of renewable energy, he relied
primarily on loans from the European Union, following in the footsteps of Sarkozy’s
supportive stance on French EU integration. This stance is particularly significant when
one considers the contentious debate about the European Union in French politics. As
with NAFTA and the TPP in the United States, many French voters assert that EU
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integration promotes outsourcing and undermines the security of French working-class
jobs. Marine Le Pen proclaimed that if she won the 2012 election, she would hold an
immediate referendum on withdrawal from the Schengen Zone and the Eurozone, a
position which is popular in the French voting public (Hewlett 2012). Like Mitterrand
before him, Hollande seems to be struggling to balance radical rhetoric before the
election with more pragmatic policies once in office (Cole 2011). Despite his claims that
moderate appeals “poisoned” his victory (Hewlett 2012), Hollande is as much the cause
as the victim.
The Parti Socialiste’s struggle to reach a coherent stance on immigration
(Raymond 2009) was another obstacle for Hollande’s campaign. His 2012 platform
included some progressive measures, among them the PS’s long-standing proposal to
allow non-citizen voting in local elections (Hewlett 2012). Yet it also included a promise
to uphold the controversial ban on the full veil and plans to set a limit on the number of
foreign workers allowed to enter the country every year (Samuel 2012). These proposals
hardened in the period after the first round but before the second, as Hollande made a
last-ditch effort to draw in some of the right-wing workers who had voted for Le Pen.
Ultimately, Hollande pursued a centrist route in order to avoid alienating either the liberal
left or the anti-immigrant working class, and in the end he began leaning more towards
the latter group than the former.
By waffling on immigration, Hollande opened room on the liberal left for more
radical candidates. These included Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who “put support for
immigrants at the very heart of his programme” with proposals that included the
regularization of undocumented immigrants and easier citizenship for those with
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documentation (Hewlett 2012). His Front de gauche (Front of the Left) combined this
with a strong populist tone on class and economic issues, functioning almost as a “mirror
image” of the Front National. Mélenchon’s core economic reforms, for instance, were
even more radical than Hollande’s, and included far higher taxes for the wealthy, a law to
raise the minimum wage, and the abolition of the European Stability Pact. Much like
Bernie Sanders in the US, Mélenchon directly linked the plight of the working class with
upper-class exploitation, and broke with the Gaullist tradition of unequal taxation and
welfare (Prasad 2005). Even so, many of his supporters ultimately backed down and
voted for the Parti Socialiste instead, driven primarily by fears that if Hollande failed to
reach the second round there would be another repeat of 2002 (Hewlett 2012).
Nevertheless, the fact that Mélenchon’s Front de gauche won 11% of the vote in the first
round by flanking left of the Parti Socialiste may give some sense of how close to the
center Hollande stands.
Hollande was still able to garner significant working-class support during the
2012 election, and in the first round of voting he beat Sarkozy by a large margin among
laborers (Corbett 2012). He also won among white-collar employees and middle
management, who, in the changing structure of the French economy, make up over a
quarter of the electorate and face many of the same economic challenges as the working
class (Hewlett 2012). Shopkeepers and industrialists, by contrast, preferred Sarkozy, who
for better or worse had gained a reputation for favoring the rich both in policy and
personal life (Mondon 2013). At a glance, then, it would seem that voting was divided
along class lines, with the working classes uniting behind a Socialist against the
neoliberal-bourgeois UMP. These numbers, however, must be kept in perspective. While
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28% of the blue-collar laborers voted for Hollande, 29% voted for Marine Le Pen–a
disproportionate ratio, considering that in the first round Le Pen won less than two-thirds
as many votes as Hollande overall (Hewlett 2012). The question now becomes one of
how a far-right candidate managed to outdo a Socialist among the working class.
Some of Marine Le Pen’s success stems from the campaign of dédiabolisation, or
“de-demonization,” which she began upon replacing her father in 2011 (Hewlett 2012).
This move to downplay the Front Nationale’s fascist reputation involved distancing
herself from her father’s brash, unscripted comments, including his recent statement that
the Holocaust was merely “a detail” of the Second World War (Horobin 2015). Her
outright rejection of anti-Semitism represents one major change from the French Right of
the 1930s, and underscores the mark which the Holocaust and the German occupation left
on French politics. Of course, this is not to say that the new Front National is much less
radical than it was before. Jean-Marie remains active within the party despite having
passed over its leadership to his daughter, and his controversial statements continue to
hamper Marine’s efforts (Williams 2011). The Front National’s more radical supporters
have also proven hard to rein in, and often make cultural and racial arguments explicit
where Le Pen had only implied them (Hewlett 2012; Nossiter 2015). But the young Le
Pen’s efforts at dédiabolisation represent a major strategy to win voters from the centerright UMP and expand the Front National’s base of support. In a 2011 poll, more
respondents than ever before reported that they considered the Front National a “party
like the other parties,” with the credibility and legitimacy normally reserved for the PS
and UMP (Pierre-Brossolette 2011). Naturally, this strategy has brought its share of
drawbacks as well, alienating the radically ethnocentric fringe that initially formed its
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core. But Marine Le Pen still won 6.5 million votes in the first round of the 2012
presidential election, a number which was almost certainly fed by the return of far-right
voters who had supported Sarkozy in 2007 (Mondon 2013). Marine Le Pen is still widely
perceived as a right-wing threat, or at least a wolf in sheep’s clothing, but compared to
her father she has pulled the FN into the mainstream.
That said, Marine Le Pen has retained her father’s xenophobic rhetoric on
immigration. Her proposed withdrawal from the Schengen Zone (Hewlett 2012) is as
much about limiting free trade as it is about re-establishing direct control over
immigration, especially Muslim immigration, into France. Much of the Front National’s
Islamophobic rhetoric concerns the perceived failure of Middle-Eastern immigrants to
assimilate into the French way of life (Mondon 2014). Much of this hostility traces its
roots back to the “hard-secularism” of French citizenship; among those of other Western
European countries, French newspapers have been exceptionally likely to use
nationalistic framing on issues of immigration, much of it rooted in values of
republicanism (Helbling 2014). Marine Le Pen has been quick to exploit this unrest,
declaring in a September rally that “Migrants are now wandering in our neighborhoods,
around the train stations or in the slums, the cause for France of immense security and
public hygiene problems…We are now becoming accustomed to terrorism” (Nossiter
2015). The following month, she was put on trial for inciting hate speech by comparing
Muslim prayers in the streets to the German occupation of France during the Second
World War. Marine Le Pen may have distanced herself from her father’s anti-Semitism,
but general xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment remains at the heart of the FN’s
appeal.
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The Front National has also framed immigration as an economic issue; as early as
the 1970s, its posters juxtaposed the number of immigrants with the number of French
unemployed (Nossiter 2015). Likewise, when Marine’s father oversaw the FN’s growth
in the 1980s and 1990s, he drew much of his support from disgruntled ex-PCF voters
who could no longer find anti-immigrant answers in Left parties (Williams 2011). As a
core element of her 2012 platform, Marine Le Pen built on this legacy by vowing to
reduce immigration by 95% and cut access to benefits for those already in the country
(Hewlett 2012). Le Pen’s plans to close refugee camps operated by pro-immigration
NGOs (Vinocur 2015) and assertions that government spending should “serve the French
first” (The Economist, 2015) draw attention to the fractured nature of the “working
class.” While unemployed native French workers and marginalized immigrants share the
same general problem of economic precariousness, both cultural identities and
perceptions of competition have often left them not only divided but mutually opposed.
This economic framing of immigration most clearly demonstrates Adams and
Weakliem’s Gramscian model of class politics: by presenting Muslims as a threat to
French jobs and French culture, Marine Le Pen is able to exploit a cultural and racial
divide between the “native” French working class and immigrant minorities who also
face economic marginalization.
Marine Le Pen’s above-average support among blue-collar workers also stems
from her redistributionist economic policies. In a campaign for the regional presidency of
the northern Pas-de-Calais region, where high unemployment among industrial workers
has become a major source of unrest, she expressed her support for welfare:
“The basic problem is that the state no longer protects you. I am committed
to making the region take the place of the state … a protective region that
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also takes care of the neediest … In this region people are brave, hard
working. If there was work they would take the work… But there is no
work.” (quoted in Vincour 2015).
Le Pen’s other campaign promises for the region include expanding job-training
programs, opening more health centers, and passing laws that will require government
contracts to favor local businesses over foreign ones (Vincour 2015). These comments
represent a stark contrast with Trump’s brand of free-market populism, in which
excessive government protection is cast as the cause of unemployment. Yet they also
react against France’s traditional right-wing Gaullist dirigisme, which for decades
sacrificed the well-being of the working classes in order to promote economic growth at
the top of the income pyramid (Prasad 2005).
By mixing cultural and economic arguments against immigration, Marine Le Pen
has managed to build two main geographic bases of support. Traditionally, the Front
National has been strongest along the Mediterranean coast, where immigration is
predominantly a cultural issue. But in the 2012 election she also did well across the east
and northeast, where the concerns of the post-industrial working class are felt the hardest.
This mixed appeal can be seen in each constituency’s support for redistribution: only
37% of Front National voters in the North believe that “taxes paid by the wealthy are too
high,” compared to 60% of those in the South (Hubert 2013). In theory, this difference in
opinions might represent a fracture line within the Front National’s base, but as long as
Marine Le Pen maintains her focus on immigration it is likely that the two geographic
groups will remain united. If anything, the FN’s ability to maintain a relatively diverse
base is evidence of its success in reaching beyond Marxian rhetoric and building a “class
campaign” which brings together working-class unrest and anti-immigrant sentiment.
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That said, while Marine Le Pen’s support may climb beyond 20% in the 2017
election, it is unlikely that she will win the second round even if she does reach it. More
worrying, at least from a Left or Center perspective, is the effect which Le Pen’s radicalright campaign had on the more centrist UMP. While Sarkozy’s shift to the Right was
well underway during his time in office, and at least on economic issues began the
moment he took over from Chirac, in the 2012 campaign he made conscious efforts to
appeal to FN voters (Hewlett 2012). These included a harsher stance on crime, one of the
FN’s principal areas of focus, and consideration of proposals to scale back the EU
integration that Sarkozy had previously promoted. More ominously, they also included
deliberate echoes of Le Pen’s anti-immigration rhetoric. Adopting the same language of
“crisis” that the Far Right had used even before Jean-Marie Le Pen’s rise, Sarkozy
conjured up images of a stark dichotomy between those who assimilated into the French
way of life and those who clung to their old values, blaming the latter for crime,
unemployment, and cultural oppression (Mondon 2013). By mimicking the language of
what was still largely considered to be an anti-democratic movement outside the
respectable mainstream, Sarkozy granted valuable legitimacy to the Front National’s antiimmigrant policies, and pushed France’s political discourse further to the right (Mondon
2013). This push reached a new height after the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris,
which sparked an outpouring of nationalism vaguely reminiscent of what followed the
9/11 attacks in the United States. Marine Le Pen was quick to exploit this surge of
emotion for personal gain, blaming the attacks on Hollande’s “crazy, undiscerning
immigration policy” (Chrisafis 2015). And indeed, much of the popular outrage that
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followed the attacks has played into the FN’s hands. Nationalism and islamophobia, once
slowly spreading on the fringe, seem to have burst into mainstream politics.
The United States
Unlike France, the United States has a history of keeping any appeals to class
below the surface. While the US has its share of far-left parties, none hold seats in
Congress, let alone the presidency; the Socialist-party candidate Eugene Debs repeatedly
ran for president in the early 20th century, but never captured more than 6 percent of the
vote. The Electoral College is winner-take-all at the state level, which has historically
made it difficult for “third parties” to effectively compete for the presidency. In practice,
the United States follows a two-party system, divided between the Democrats on the left
and the Republicans on the right. This results in “minimum winning coalitions,” in which
single parties are able to achieve legislative majorities – however ineffective or shortlived – without having to form coalitions with minor parties (Hicks and Swank 1992).
The need for one party to secure an absolute majority further tightens the two-party
system. If the French left learned the dangers of splitting the vote in 2002, the American
left learned it in 2000, when Ralph Nader pulled enough voters away from the
Democratic candidate to tip the election in George W. Bush’s favor.
Because opportunities for new class-based or issue-based parties to enter the
political sphere are limited, radical voices must emerge from within one of the two
mainstream parties. Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump have taken this lesson to heart,
and even though both have identified as Independents in the past (Roberts 2015b; Allen
2015) they are now running as a Democrat and a Republican respectively. Furthermore,
while France’s first round of elections allows any voter to vote for any candidate, in most
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US states only registered members of a given party are allowed to vote in that party’s
primary. Combined with relatively low participation among moderate voters, this means
that candidates in the primaries must frame their appeals to the most ideologically
extreme members of their own party (Jacobson 2012). This, in turn, makes it even harder
for presidential candidates to organize a base of support which transcends social
liberalism and conservatism in favor of a united focus on lower-class interests.
Historical Trajectory
Between the 1970s and the present day, both income inequality and political
polarization have skyrocketed in the United States (DeSilver 2013), but there is little
evidence to suggest that the trends are causally linked. The level of ideological difference
between the top 20% and the bottom 40% of earners has fluctuated since 1972, falling in
the middle of the ‘80s and spiking in the late ‘90s, but when seen as an overall trend, it
shows little sign of consistent increase or decrease from the 1970s to the present day.
Likewise, while the rich have become slightly more conservative, the proportion of
liberals within the top income quintile has remained steady (Dettrey and Campbell 2013).
As I will describe below, it seems that the main driver of partisan polarization is
ideological polarization, with Conservative Democrats switching to the Republican Party
and vice versa for Liberal Republicans. To some extent this is a result of the partisan
realignment of the South in the 1970s, which turned ideology from an internally divisive
issue within each party into an internally uniting one (Dettrey and Campbell 2013).
Ideological sorting may even counteract income-based political polarization, as poor
Conservatives and wealthy Liberals place ideology before class.
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Jonathan Knuckey (2015) confirms this interpretation, finding that among white
voters living outside of the South, class issues have been increasingly moderated by
ideology. While low-income liberals have remained a solidly Democratic constituency
from the 1970s to the present, low-income moderates and conservatives have become less
likely to identify as Democrats, as have moderates and conservatives in the middle class
(Knuckey 2015). The effect at the upper-class level is also interesting. While wealthy
conservatives, never a large part of the Democratic base, have continued to drain from the
party, the likelihood of upper-class and middle-class liberals to identify as Democrats has
soared (Knuckey 2015). These findings are consistent with the nationwide study by
Dettrey and Campbell (2013), who found that in the ‘70s, ‘80s, and early ‘90s lowincome voters actually became more conservative and less liberal, though this trend
reversed in 1996. Over the same four decades the number of upper-class and middle-class
individuals identifying as liberal has also steadily increased, allowing the Democratic
Party to maintain a solid majority in the rest of the county even as it cedes the South to
Republican control (Knuckey 2015). The Democratic Party has indeed become more
polarized, but this process has been driven by social liberalism, not social class.
US labor unions have also steadily lost their class character, and have instead
been incorporated into politics as interest groups. Unlike their Canadian counterparts,
which still function as a “class representative,” American unions have faced plummeting
membership and now have a weaker political voice (Eidlin 2015). Consequently, debates
over the quality of work have been transformed from a matter of class conflict into a
concern for individual workers to sort out with management. In the prominent 1972
government report entitled Work in America, for example, labor unions are mentioned on
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only 2 out of 284 pages–and the purpose of that small passage is to accuse them of
making workers’ lives more difficult (Eidlin 2015). Thus, even this interest-group role
has not given labor unions a secure political voice; as class issues fade from the debate
and wealthier constituencies become more important, the Democratic Party has become
less willing to stand up for issues of labor. Nevertheless, labor unions remain a solidly
Democratic constituency, and donate much more money to Democratic candidates than
Republicans (OpenSecrets 2015). On issues of immigration, many labor unions have
even put aside their past protectionist stance (Milkman 2011), calling for solidarity with
immigrant labor.
More important, perhaps, are the political interests that have replaced labor unions
at the heart of the Democratic constituency. While Dettrey and Campbell (2013) find that
the likelihood of individuals in the upper income quintile to identify with the Democratic
Party has not changed considerably over the last three decades, Knuckey (2015) attributes
this to the departure of wealthy conservatives from the party and the influx of wealthy
and middle-class liberals. As a result, the Democratic Party is faced not only with a
declining emphasis on social class, but an influential constituency of upper-class liberals.
This upper-class liberal constituency is sufficiently strong that during the 2008 election,
Barack Obama actually won by a narrow margin among voters with incomes over
$200,000 (Eidlin 2015a). The Democratic Party now relies on donations of over $1,500
for more than half its campaign money, not terribly unlike Republicans (Edsall 2015a).
The effects of this dependence were made clear in January 2015, when President Obama
proposed a plan to tax upper-class college-saving accounts and allocate the revenue to
programs aimed at low-income families–only to abandon the plan within a week under
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pressure from Democratic Congressmen with large upper-class-liberal constituencies
(Edsall 2015b). Upper-class support can strengthen a movement, but also constrains its
options.
That said, upper-class Democrats will not necessarily oppose redistribution by
default. As the Gramscian framework predicts, “classes” can often be motivated as much
by cultural identities as by economic ones, and one can readily add ideology into the mix.
In a study of how conceptions of morality differ by political orientation, Haidt (2012)
finds that Americans identifying as liberal tend to place a relatively higher value on the
virtues of Care and Fairness, which are easily invoked to gain sympathy for the poor and
downtrodden. American conservatives tend to attach less importance to these virtues,
instead emphasizing Loyalty, Sanctity, and Authority, though the gap between Liberals
and Conservatives’ support for different kinds of morality is not as great as one might
expect (Haidt 2012). These moral-ideological values have the potential to complement
and at times suppress material class interest, leading wealthy Democrats to sympathize
with the poor but also allowing Republicans to mobilize support for social conservatism
and anti-immigrant policies.
Dynamics of the 2016 Election
Though running as a Democrat, and describing himself as a Socialist, Bernie
Sanders is best described as a Social Democrat, and one not far from the European
middle-left model. He claims that the US economy is structured in a way that
systematically disadvantages those at the bottom, even when “the bottom” is widely
defined as the lower 99% of incomes, and asserts that his policies will address income
inequality as the root of American economic problems. According to Curtis (2013) and
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Evans (1993), lower-class powerlessness should be associated with support for
redistributive policies, so Sanders’s tirade against income inequality and calls for a more
equitable economy should in theory draw support from the marginalized lower classes.
To give a typical example of his campaign’s rhetoric, the issues section of his campaign
website is overlooked by a banner which reads:
The American people must make a fundamental decision. Do we continue
the 40-year decline of our middle class and the growing gap between the
very rich and everyone else, or do we fight for a progressive economic
agenda that creates jobs, raises wages, protects the environment and
provides health care for all? Are we prepared to take on the enormous
economic and political power of the billionaire class, or do we continue to
slide into economic and political oligarchy? These are the most important
questions of our time, and how we answer them will determine the future of
our country (Sanders 2015a).
In this passage, Sanders not only points out typical lower-income concerns such as
poverty, unemployment, and the decline of the middle class, but also explicitly frames
these concerns as matters of social inequality, contrasting the plight of ordinary
Americans with the growing wealth of those at the top. In doing so he creates a narrative
of exploitation, in which the wealthy benefit from the poor treatment of working-class
Americans. In the framework of Weakliem and Adams (2011), this calls to mind the
Weberian or even the Marxian approach, seeking to unite the “bottom 99 percent” against
the “top one percent” or even the much narrower “billionaire class.” It emphasizes a
material class interest by which the majority of the population can gain from leveling the
playing field with the very highest earners.
Given his references to income inequality, and his Social Democratic platform,
one would expect Sanders’s policy to be popular among low-income voters and to fade as
one moves into higher income brackets. A November poll conducted by Langer
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Research, however, shows the opposite; if anything, Sanders seems to be viewed more
favorably among those with high incomes (Figure 2). The gap has closed between August
and November, but when the full dataset is read more closely, it seems that much of this
change can be attributed to greater publicity about his campaign, as early in August many
low-income voters reported that they simply had not heard enough about the candidate to
make a judgment either way. Another proxy variable for social class is educational
attainment, which in the United States’ growing knowledge economy limits how far one
can climb on the social ladder. The results for this measurement are somewhat
ambiguous; when voters of all party backgrounds were asked whether their opinion of a
candidate is favorable, Sanders seems to do better among those with college degrees
(Figure 3), but when Democrats and Democrat-leaners are asked to choose the one
candidate they would vote for in the primaries, Clinton does better among those with
college degrees (Figure 4). Contrary to expectations of class-versus-class organization,
and in line with the predictions of the Gramscian perspective on class politics, Sanders
not only lacked uniformly strong support among the “working class” but is viewed more
favorably among voters with higher household income and educational attainment.
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Figure 2: Favorability of Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton by Income (data from
Holyk 2015)
Favorable toward Clinton
Favorable toward
Sanders
November
August
November
August
over $100,000
45
41
48
42
$50-100,000
40
36
39
38
under $50,000
53
52
40
22
Figure 3: Favorability of Sanders and Clinton by Education (data from Malloy 2016b)
Hillary Clinton
Bernie
Sanders
Favorable
Unfavorable
Favorable Unfavorable
College Degree
48
49
56
37
No College Degree
35
59
46
37
Figure 4: Preferred Candidate by education among Democrats and Democrat-leaners
(data from Malloy 2016b)
Hillary Clinton
Bernie Sanders
College Degree
55
34
No College Degree
47
41

While Bernie Sanders is, as of this time, still struggling to catch up with Hillary
Clinton, Donald Trump has secured a strong, steady lead in the presidential primaries.
Already famous as a real estate mogul and the host of the reality TV program The
Apprentice, he has few reservations about discussing his net worth in public. In his early
campaign he sought to capitalize on his elite status, and more generally his status as a
political outsider, by asserting that he would use his skills as a businessman to run the
country efficiently (Ronayne 2015). Yet in spite of his personal status as one of the
richest people in the country, Trump is nevertheless running a decidedly populist
campaign. Read with a careful eye, his campaign website is sprinkled with references to
the plight of middle-class and working-class Americans, and many of the problems he
mentions would not be out of place on Bernie Sanders’s website: corporate tax loopholes,
the shrinking middle class, the danger of shipping jobs overseas while so many
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Americans are out of work (Trump 2015). A key difference, however, lies in where the
blame lies. Though he does criticize corporations which relocate overseas to evade US
taxes, he pins more of the blame on the US government for making taxes and regulations
too burdensome and on China for “cheating” with unfair trade practices. In doing so, he
suggests that workers and business owners have a shared interest in a healthy economy,
eschewing class competition in favor of class unity. This in itself is not entirely unusual.
When choosing their stances on economic issues, voters’ subjective perceptions of what
helps the economy at large frequently take precedence over their material interests as
individuals or members of a class (Dettrey and Campbell 2013). Deflecting the blame to
external threats also offers a convenient opportunity to appeal to nationalism. Trump used
the same approach when testing the waters for a presidential campaign in 1988, though at
that time the targets were Japan and the Persian Gulf states (Allen 2015). If the “superrich” and the “billionaire class” represent convenient straw-man enemies for Sanders,
foreigners of all kinds seem to be Trump’s favorite scapegoat.
The question of whether Trump has won the blue-collar vote, however, yields
mixed results. During the early days of the presidential race in early July, Trump enjoyed
more or less equal support among Americans in low-, middle-, and high-income
categories (Washington Post 2015). Turning again to education as a proxy for social
mobility, Figure 5 shows that Republicans without a college degree are more likely to
choose Trump as their preferred nominee, a trend which has held true since the race
began (Washington Post 2015) and which remains true when one expands the scope of
analysis to all Americans. Kasich, by contrast, is more popular among those with a
college degree, and Cruz’s support is fairly even between both categories. This measure,
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however, is somewhat skewed by Trump’s high disapproval among Hispanics and
African-Americans, who suffer from disproportionately low income and educational
attainment due to structural inequalities in US society. This provides a reasonable basis to
believe that Trump’s favorability among whites without a college degree is even higher
than his average favorability among all people without a college degree, which would
further support my findings. Unfortunately, I cannot test this theory with the data sets I
have, as these do not allow me to control for one variable while examining another.
Figure 5: Preferred Candidate by Education among Republicans and Republican-leaners
(data from Malloy 2016b)
March 2016
% Prefer Trump
% Prefer Cruz
% Prefer Kasich
College Degree
34
26
28
No College Degree
46
29
12
The most fascinating findings, however, emerge when one measures class in
terms of one’s perceptions of economic precariousness and marginalization. Like
educational attainment, concerns about social mobility can be used to assess an
individual’s ability to adapt to the transition from an industrial economy to a knowledge
economy. And while economic precariousness does not necessarily match one’s income,
it does call to mind Curtis (2013)’s recognition that self-assessed class categorizations
can capture important dynamics of subjectivity better than objective, material measures.
Figure 6 shows that compared with the other two Republican front-runners, Trump
supporters are the most likely to feel that they are falling behind economically.
Furthermore, this seems to translate into a disillusionment with the established political
and economic system. These are all easily recognizable features of populist class politics:
politically disenfranchised, economically marginalized voters expressing a wide-reaching
desire for radical change.
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Figure 6: Percentage of a candidate’s supporters feeling marginalized (Data from
Schwarz 2016)
“I feel as though I’m falling further and further behind economically”
Trump supporters
Cruz supporters
Kasich supporters
Agree
78
62
44
Disagree
22
37
56
“The old way of doing things no longer works and we need radical change”
Trump supporters
Cruz supporters
Kasich supporters
Agree
83
56
48
Disagree
13
41
51
“Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”
Trump supporters
Cruz supporters
Agree
90
79
Disagree
10
18

Kasich supporters
75
25

Naturally, this invites the question of whether the same is true on the Left;
Sanders has certainly built a large part of his campaign on the idea that the current
economic order has failed us, and that economic inequality is a major problem that has to
be addressed. And indeed, the equivalent data in Figure 7 show that Sanders’s supporters
are considerably more likely than Clinton’s to report that they feel economically
precarious and dissatisfied with the established order. But as soon as these are held
alongside the distribution of views in the other party, the image changes considerably. On
all three measures of dissatisfaction, Sanders’s supporters are not terribly different from
the average Republican (the margin of error being 2.7 percentage points). When
considered alongside Trump’s supporters (Figure 6), they are in fact less dissatisfied and
less radical. This runs in direct contrast to the more familiar Marxian model of class
politics, which predicts that economically precarious workers eager for revolutionary
change will flock to the left-leaning socialist while prosperous elites comfortable with the
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political order will unite behind the right-wing multi-billionaire. Yet it is entirely
consistent with the more nuanced Gramscian model.
Figure 7: Percentage of a candidate’s supporters feeling marginalized (Data from
Schwarz 2016)
“I feel as though I’m falling further and further behind economically”
Sanders supporters
Clinton supporters
(Republicans)
Agree
61
38
67
Disagree
39
62
32
“The old way of doing things no longer works and we need radical change”
Sanders supporters
Clinton supporters
(Republicans)
Agree
76
45
71
Disagree
23
53
27
“Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”
Sanders supporters
Clinton supporters
Agree
75
61
Disagree
25
37

(Republicans)
84
14

To explain this outcome in a Gramscian way, one must not look at these
movements as the spontaneous awakening of mass movements whose only grievances are
economic. Instead, one must analyze their intersection with other motives and political
views. One potentially promising intersecting factor is ideology. As Dettrey and
Campbell (2013) and Knuckey (2015) argue, for the last forty years or so the American
party system has seen a re-alignment along ideological lines, with Conservatives of all
classes moving to the Republican Party as Liberals of all classes move to the Democratic
Party. Individuals who are “consistently liberal” or “consistently conservative” also tend
to be more politically active and more resistant to compromise (Dimock et al. 2014),
suggesting that they would be more likely to support radical candidates like Sanders and
Trump.
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Donald Trump’s base, however, does not fully fit this explanation. Given his
reputation for radical and controversial statements on nearly every issue, such as the
aforementioned assertion about Mexican “rapists,” one would expect his supporters to be
heavily concentrated toward the far right. And indeed, in August 2015 when the
campaign was still in its early days, the vast majority of Liberal Democrats reported
being “very unfavorable” toward Trump while Conservative Republicans were the most
supportive (Washington Post 2015). More recently in March 2016, 87% of Democrats
reported that they would definitely not vote for Trump in the presidential election, higher
than the percentage of Republicans categorically refusing to vote for Clinton (Malloy
2016b). Yet when one limits the sample to Trump’s Republican supporters, a somewhat
more complex picture emerges. In a distribution that remained fairly consistent from
November 2015 to March 2016, Ted Cruz is most popular among more conservative
Republicans, while Kasich is most popular among liberal and moderate Republicans (see
Figure 8). Donald Trump, however, receives roughly equal support across the spectrum
of Republican ideology, with little difference between the proportions of Very
Conservative, Somewhat Conservative, and Moderate or Liberal Republicans who chose
him as their preferred front-runner. This suggests that he is not focusing his appeals
toward the more conservative fringe of the party, as Cruz and the Tea Party have, but that
his message transcends the typical spectrum of Conservative ideology.
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Figure 8: Favorite Candidate by Ideology among Republicans and Republican-leaners
(Data from Malloy 2015, Malloy 2016b)
March 2016
% Prefer Trump
% Prefer Cruz
% Prefer Kasich
Very Conservative
42
47
6
Somewhat Conservative
45
23
15
Moderate or Liberal
40
17
28
November 2015
Very Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Moderate or Liberal

% Prefer Trump
25
25
31

% Prefer Cruz
29
14
3

% Prefer Kasich
-2
3

It would be slightly disingenuous to call Donald Trump an ideological mediator
capable of working across party lines, but his appeal is not rooted solely in far-right
ideological extremism either. The crowds drawn to his rallies include large numbers of
moderates, independents, and even former Democrats, as well as individuals of all ages
who had not yet voted in a presidential primary election (McManus 2016). Unlike the
Front National (Cole 2003), Trump has not been able to pull over large numbers of farleft radicals who once identified as active Communists, but he has benefited from the
wider trend in which conservatives have gradually left the Democratic Party (Knuckey
2015). The number of newly mobilized primary voters in his ranks, however, is
particularly surprising when one considers that people who do not regularly vote in
primaries usually tend to be more moderate and apathetic than their more active
counterparts (Dimock et al. 2014). It also mirrors, from the other side of the party’s
divide, Hill and Leighley (1996)’s finding that in districts where the Democratic Party is
strong it pursues a strategy of mobilizing lower-class voters to take part in presidential
elections. And it underscores Trump’s Gramscian form of class politics, as he relies less
on the more familiar Republican arguments about abortion, Christian values, and nuanced
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supply-side economics, building a coalition that is united more by general dissatisfaction
and anti-immigrant hostility than by conservative ideology in itself.
Bernie Sanders, by contrast, appears to have drawn more actively on wider liberal
ideology. Sanders is more popular among Democrats identifying as Very Liberal and less
popular among those identifying as moderate or conservative (Figure 9), a pattern which
is not apparent in Trump’s base. This approach allows him to unite wealthy liberals and
educated youth, who were among those at the core of his base from the beginning of his
campaign, with more marginalized groups. This is not to say that college students and the
young are free from economic precariousness; tuition debt is a major burden for many
graduates, and Sanders’s promises of tuition-free college directly appeal to this concern.
Yet young individuals with college degrees still stand a better chance of adapting to the
knowledge economy than unemployed factory workers. Sanders’s approach relies to
some extent on trends in Haidt (2012)’s liberal morality, emphasizing the values of care
and fairness toward downtrodden victims in a way that appeals to the feelings of liberals
who are better-off themselves. Yet it also has its own limitations. Dividing Democrats
and Democrat-leaners by ideological consistency (Appendix 1), we see that the
demographic groups among which Sanders was popular from the start–whites, college
graduates, and the upper middle class–stand near the top of the list, with more than 6 in
10 respondents ranked as “Consistently Liberal” or “Mostly Liberal.” But less privileged
and more precarious demographics, such as African-Americans, Hispanics, low-earners,
and the less educated, are among the least likely to identify as “Consistent Liberals.”
This, along with poor name recognition, was one of the issues that constrained Sanders’s
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support among minorities early in his campaign and led journalists to speculate about his
apparent unpopularity among African-American voters (Cohn 2015).
Figure 9: Favorite candidate by Ideology, among Democrats and Democrat-leaners
(Data from Malloy 2015, Malloy 2016b)
March 2016
% Prefer Clinton
% Prefer Sanders
Very Liberal
37
60
Somewhat Liberal
57
33
Moderate or Conservative
51
33
November 2015
% Prefer Clinton
% Prefer Sanders
Very Liberal
48
47
Somewhat Liberal
60
33
Moderate or Conservative
62
24
If ideology alone is not sufficient to explain the divergence between Trump and
Sanders’s campaigns, then what is? One explanation may relate to the candidates’ stances
on immigration and minority rights. Unlike Trump, Bernie Sanders has tried to frame
immigration as a matter of solidarity rather than exploitation. On the immigration section
of his issues website, he begins with a personal story about his efforts to build bonds
between migrant workers and organized labor in southern Florida. From there, he moves
on to call for policies that can improve immigrants’ well-being, emphasizing “…the
historic role of the United States as a protector of vulnerable people fleeing persecution”
(Sanders 2015b). As with the case of income inequality, he attributes the plight of
immigrant workers to corporate exploitation, telling his audience that “…guest workers
are routinely cheated out of wages, held virtually captive by employers who seize their
documents, forced to live in inhumane conditions and denied medical treatment for onthe-job injuries” (Sanders 2015b). Unlike Trump, and even unlike many labor unions, he
does not level any accusations that immigrants are stealing jobs from American workers.
If anything, he blames any loss of jobs on American corporate employers who exploit
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immigrant labor for profit, stressing his claim that immigrants and US-born workers
share a common foe.
On the issue of immigrant agency, his stance appears to have undergone some
subtle adjustment. When I read the aforementioned page for an earlier draft of this paper,
I noted that its tone seemed to drift closer to paternalism than solidarity, presenting
immigrant workers as passive victims rather than fellow workers engaged in active
resistance. This echoed Haidt’s (2012) framework of liberal morality with appeals to the
values of Care and Fairness. Since then, however, the page has been updated to address
this problem. Its opening paragraph now stresses the shared nature of the immigrant
experience: “I am proud to be the son of an immigrant. My father came to this country
from Poland without a nickel in his pocket. Their story, my story, our story is a story of
America: hard-working families coming to the United States to create a brighter future
for their children” (Sanders 2015b). Further down the page, his visit to an immigrant
farmers’ union in Immokalee is reframed as a “tremendous grassroots effort,” and he
calls for “[a] political revolution that mobilizes millions of Americans inclusive of
Latinos and immigrants.” These small changes in tone represent a wider effort to address
Sanders’s apparent deficit of support among blacks and Hispanics, and in combination
with deeper trends like increasing awareness of the candidate they have steadily closed
his gap with Clinton among these groups (Figure 10). While Sanders may have faced
serious accusations of neglecting race issues early in his campaign, his response to these
accusations appears to have paid off.
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Figure 10: Favorability of candidates by Race among all respondents (data from Malloy
2015, Malloy 2016a)
February 20164
Hillary Clinton
Bernie Sanders
Demographic
%Favorable %Unfavorable
%Favorable %Unfavorable
Whites
28 (-7)
68 (+8)
46 (+5)
43 (+7)
Blacks
84 (0)
13 (-1)
78 (+21)
6 (-5)
Hispanics
56 (-8)
33 (+6)
58 (-2)
12 (-4)
November 2015
Demographic
Whites
Blacks
Hispanics

Hillary Clinton
%Favorable %Unfavorable
35
60
84
14
64
27

Bernie Sanders
%Favorable %Unfavorable
41
36
57
11
60
16

Donald Trump, by contrast, favors accusation over solidarity. His campaign
website sets aside an issue page for “immigration reform,” which consists almost entirely
of calls for greater limits on immigration (Trump 2015). These include not only harsher
penalties and reduced amnesty for undocumented immigrants, but also substantially
greater employment and residency restrictions for those with valid visas. Many of his
policies are backed up with allusions to crime and lawlessness, and some are eerily
reminiscent of his infamous statement that undocumented immigrants are rapists (Scott
2015). Yet by and large, the dominant frame which appears in the page is economic, with
repeated claims that undocumented immigrants pose a threat to American workers. In a
direct appeal to working-class interests, it asserts that “[t]he influx of foreign workers
holds down salaries, keeps unemployment high, and makes it difficult for poor and
working class Americans–including immigrants themselves and their children–to earn a
middle class wage” (Trump 2015). Its opening section goes further by calling the

The more recent Quinnipiac dataset for March 2016 replaced the options “Black” and “Hispanic” with
“Non-White;” to avoid confounding effects, I used the February data, which retained the original options.
4
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Schumer-Rubio immigration bill “a giveaway to the corporate patrons who run both
parties” and asserting that “[r]eal immigration reform puts the needs of working people
first – not wealthy globetrotting donors” (Trump 2015). Epithets like these would not be
out of place in Sanders’s rallies and speeches. The page even includes sympathetic
references to the high unemployment rates faced by women, blacks, and Hispanic youth,
problems which Trump attributes to the presence of low-wage immigrant labor. This type
of appeal calls to mind the arguments which US labor unions have historically raised in
order to keep their members’ jobs secure (Milkman 2011). Like Marine Le Pen, Trump
articulates an immigration policy which blends cultural and security concerns with
economic ones.
These feelings on immigration are echoed by Trump’s supporters, sometimes
even in more open terms. According to a survey conducted in July, more than eight in ten
of Trump’s early supporters agreed that “immigrants today are a burden on our country
because they take our jobs, housing, and health care,” (Lapinsky, Clinton, and Roush
2015), a surprisingly large majority considering the strength of that statement. Among
Republican supporters not aligned with Trump, the figure was closer to six in ten,
substantially lower but still alarmingly high. Notably, the anti-immigrant sentiment
measured by this question is expressed not in cultural or even criminal terms, but solely
in terms of competition for jobs, housing, and government funds. Reporting in terms of
overall favorability clarifies the story (Figure 11). Trump has stronger support among
whites than any other demographic, while African-Americans are far less favorable of
Trump on average, in spite of his website’s attribution of black youth unemployment to
immigrant competition (Trump 2015) and past theories about black-Hispanic competition
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for urban resources (cited in Cohn 2015). Hispanics are also overwhelmingly unfavorable
toward Trump, suggesting that his references to “illegal immigrants” are still interpreted
in racial terms, though they have improved substantially since last November when only
9% viewed him favorably (Malloy 2015).
Figure 11: Percentage of demographics with Favorable or Unfavorable views of Trump
(Malloy 2016a)
Removed for copyright reasons.

This sharp divergence in immigration policy accounts for much of the difference
in the character of Trump and Sanders’s campaigns. As Figures 9 and 10 show, when
looking only at matters of economic precariousness and political disenfranchisement, the
two campaigns appear similar, and if anything Trump looks like the more radical of the
two. Yet on questions relating to multiculturalism, a very different picture emerges.
Trump’s supporters overwhelmingly believe that their values, and by extension
America’s values, are under threat (Figure 12). This is a sentiment which mirrors longstanding claims by the Front National that multiculturalism has failed and France is in
danger of losing its national identity. Sanders’s supporters are at best divided on this
issue, generally but not overwhelmingly disagreeing.
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Figure 12: Candidates’ supporters’ feelings on multiculturalism (Data from Schwarz
2016)
“America has lost its identity”
Trump supporters
Sanders supporters (national average)
Agree
85
45
57
Disagree
14
53
43
“I feel as though my beliefs and values are under attack in America these days”
Trump supporters
Sanders supporters (national average)
Agree
91
45
62
Disagree
9
55
37
“The government has gone too far in assisting minority groups”
Trump supporters
Sanders supporters (national average)
Agree
80
19
45
Disagree
16
79
53

But it is the last question, that of assistance to minority groups, which illustrates
the deepest divide between the two sides and best demonstrates the Gramscian model of
class politics in action. At the risk of generalization between ideal-types, Sanders can be
said to have built his constituency on a three-legged coalition of blue-collar white
Democrats, marginalized racial minorities, and liberal, college-educated youth. By
presenting minority groups as victims alongside, and within, the working class, he can
unite this broad coalition around social and cultural sympathies that transcend class-asincome. Trump, by contrast, can be seen to draw much of his support from people who
feel economically marginalized but believe that competition from immigrants is part of
the problem. It would be almost unthinkable for Bernie Sanders to make the same claim,
as this would create a major schism within his base, driving away liberals who are
economically comfortable but feel sympathy for oppressed minorities in American and
abroad. Yet Sanders’s current strategy is something of a double-edged sword: as long as

Brown 48
he pursues it, he can consolidate his minority support, but will have a hard time extending
his appeal to people who fervently believe that his proposed solutions are part of the
problem.
Conclusion
France and the United States differ greatly not only in their current political
institutions, but also in their political and cultural histories, with a rich assortment of
explicitly class-based leftist movements in the former but a tendency toward two-party
ideological conflict in the latter. I find that the relatively sudden emergence of Donald
Trump and Bernie Sanders as major candidates in the United States can be better
understood by comparing it to a similar but more gradual trend in France. In both
countries, the “proletarian class” has failed to unite behind Socialist or Social-Democratic
candidates like Bernie Sanders and François Hollande, who despite their radical rhetoric
still rely on educated liberals for much of their support. At the same time, we are seeing
the emergence of a new form of right-wing populism, led by Donald Trump in the United
States and two generations of Le Pens in France. These candidates have garnered
considerable support among low-income and less-educated whites by exploiting anxiety
over economic instability but re-directing this anxiety against immigrant labor and
cultural alienation. Drawing on what Weakliem and Adams (2011) identify as the
Hegemonic or Gramscian frame, I interpret this as evidence that white-working-class
fears of immigration (however exaggerated) are not simply a matter of false
consciousness or insufficient awareness. Rather, they represent an important line along
which class politics are waged. Just as left-wing social democrats are relying on
multiculturalism to unite their lower-class and upper-class constituencies on a common
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liberal front, right-wing populists like Trump and Le Pen are using fears over
immigration and cultural identity to pull working-class voters away from socialist
campaigns.
Even though Donald Trump currently leads in the Republican party primary, this
should not be taken as a sign that he may soon win the presidency. As of March 2016,
“54% of American voters say they ‘would definitely not’ vote for Trump” (Malloy
2016b), which will prove a major obstacle when he runs in the general election.
Interestingly, only 27% of voters in the same poll stated that they “would definitely not”
vote for Sanders, compared to 43% for Clinton – suggesting that socialism is not as
unpalatable a concept as it once was in the United States. There is also the precedent set
by France’s 2002 election, where Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the top two in the first
round of voting but was decisively defeated in the second round as even left-leaning
voters reluctantly rallied around the lesser of two evils and re-elected the unpopular
Chirac. That said, one should not make the mistake of thinking that once November
comes and goes, all the surprises and upsets of this past year will fade away like another
bad dream. Donald Trump’s brand of right-wing populism, which appeals to real
dissatisfaction about economic precariousness but responds with angry finger-pointing
about taxation and immigration, has found a wide and resilient following, demonstrating
the strength of a Gramscian class politics which appeals to real unrest against perceived
opponents. Unless the core issues behind these grievances are addressed within the next
four years, which appears increasingly unlikely given long-term economic trends and
transitions in the US and the increasingly deadlocked nature of Congress, this rhetoric
will return with a vengeance in the race for 2020. Once again, France provides a
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precedent, though a less reassuring one for critics of Trump: while Jean-Marie Le Pen did
not win any of the presidential elections in which he competed, he turned the Front
National from a fringe movement into a steadily growing party with one-fifth of the
electorate as its base, and opened the way for Marine Le Pen to turn it into a mainstream
party. Just as Sanders hoped to bring the neglected topic of income inequality into
American political discourse, Trump may have succeeded in eroding the norms of
political correctness and encouraging marginalized white workers to express hostility
toward immigrants, Muslims, and other minorities.
That said, my findings are by no means sufficient to answer all questions about
this turbulent new chapter in American presidential politics. In order to allow more
accurate study of this phenomenon, there is a need for more detailed polls which, for
example, examine a candidate’s class support while controlling for race and ideology.
Results from these could test my speculation earlier in this article that Trump’s support
among households earning below $50,000 is the average of very low minority support but
relatively high white support. Studies like these should take advantage of the current
political context, as it may be easier to interview or poll supporters of candidates while
the campaigns are still ongoing. Future research should also expand this comparative
focus to other countries, in order to determine whether fragmented class politics and
right-wing populism in the United States and France are part of a wider trend in other
developed western democracies and in the global economic periphery.
Finally, my claim that race, national origin, and ideology are important
components of class politics should not be mistaken for a claim that ethnic and racial
categories are static. Changes in civil society, economic competition, public interaction,
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and innumerable other variables can change the importance accorded to ethnicity, which
is itself a historically malleable social construct. Fifty years ago, native-born French did
not consider North Africans a threat, and today’s Parisians do not consider rural French
villagers a separate and inferior race. Even in the United States, there are promising signs
that labor unions and immigrants are increasingly putting aside their history of mutual
distrust and working together in the workplace and the public sphere (Milkman 2011).
But if one ultimately wishes to overcome racial and ethnic divides, this is all the more
reason to understand their deep role in class conflict. Decades of mutual suspicion cannot
be swept away with a few strongly worded appeals for solidarity, especially in a country
where the last three generations have been taught to associate capitalism with freedom
and abundance and socialism with bread lines and secret police. Any major paradigm
shifts that do take place are just as likely to be guided by long-term social forces above
and beyond what even the most energetic presidential campaign can stir up. After all, the
specter of Communism has been haunting Europe for over a century and a half now, and
the single-minded proletarian class-for-itself is still nowhere to be seen.
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Appendix 1: Proportions of Registered Democrats who identify as “Consistently
Liberal,” “Mostly Liberal,” “Moderate,” or “Conservative Democrat” (chart from Cohn
2015).
Removed for copyright reasons.
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